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This article examines the role of ambiguity in processes of institutional change.  One challenge 
for understanding institutional change is to overcome the rather “oversocialized” view of action 
within Institutional theory.  Drawing upon recent work in sociology, the paper introduces a non-
teleological model of action that stresses the ambiguity of institutionalized beliefs.  Ambiguity is 
then applied to Masahiko Aoki`s concept of institutions as “summary representation” of a 
strategic game. Rather than institutional break down, ambiguity is associated with incremental 
modes of institutional change through creative reinterpretation and redeployment of old 
institutions for new purposes.  Empirically, the paper applies these considerations to 
understanding the historical evolution of employee codetermination in Germany.  The continuity 
in formal legal rules of codetermination contrasts with remarkable diversity as an organizational 
practice—over time, across industrial sectors and between individual firms.  Codetermination 
illustrates how ambiguity originated in political compromise, but also how ambiguous agreement 
allows scope for institutional innovation.  Ambiguity is thus central for understanding how 






...to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never fixed, that it must 
be constantly won. 
“The Ethics of Ambiguity” –Simone de Beauvoir 
 
It was all different; that, at least, seemed sure.  We still agreed — but only that 
she'd changed. 
“Mutability” -- W.D. Snodgrass  
 
 
Institutions are commonly seen as formal and informal “rules of the game” that provide economic 
agents with incentives and constraints, and thereby induce stable patterns of behavior.
1  
Institutional constraints from political, legal and social environments often lead to institutional 
isomorphism whereby organizations to adopt similar structures and routines (Meyer and Rowan 
1977).  Institutional theory has thus offered powerful explanations of why organizations have 
diverse responses to similar economic pressures.
2   Conversely, institutions may present 
comparative advantages for different types of activities (Hall and Gingerich 2001, Whitley 1999, 
Streeck 1992).  These insights have laid a valuable foundation for international comparisons of 
business, corporate governance or industrial relations. 
Institutional change has nonetheless remained a theoretical puzzle. Institutional theory 
itself falls into several distinct paradigms that characterize the creation, stability and change of 
institutions differently (Thelen 1999, Hall and Taylor 1996, Powell and DiMaggio 1991). 
Institutions may be seen in regulative, normative or cognitive terms.  But institutional analysis 
generally shares an emphasis on the constraining character of institutions.  To the extent that 
behavior is consistent with institutional rules (choice-within-constraints), institutional change 
seems almost inevitably to be exogenous.
 3  Meanwhile, institutions remain resistant to change 
                                                           
1  The author thanks Peter Hall, Wolfgang Streeck, Kathy Thelen, Josh Whitford and two 
anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.  All errors are my own. 
2 In practice, institutional factors are often “added on” to baseline models of an institution-less 
economy to explain why reality deviates from the pure model. 
3 For example, Douglas North (1990) outlines two mechanisms of institutional change: changes 
in relative prices and changes in preferences.  Yet North treats both change in (objective) 
prices or (subjective) preferences as exogenous parameters.    
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because of increasing returns, sunk costs, complementarities between different institutions, or 
power differentials that make change largely path dependent (Mahoney 2000).   
In this chapter, I argue that understanding institutional change requires taking seriously 
the ambiguity of social life.  Institutions may reduce uncertainty,
4  but the meaning of an 
institution is never completely clear.  Actors face institutions in ever changing situations.   
Institutionalized rules and expectations represent these contingencies in only general terms, and 
can often be interpreted in more than one way.  The social boundaries and interpretations of what 
an institution demands or allows may remain ambiguous.  Ambiguity leads actors to continually 
reinterpret institutional opportunities and constraints, as well as adapt and modify institutional 
rules.  Since institutions remain an imperfect guide for action, actors may “discover” new faces of 
an institution over time through learning, experimentation and historical accidents.  Likewise, 
ambiguity gives scope for contention and conflict over the meaning of an institution.  Many 
institutions are based on political compromises whose contents are only loosely defined.  Such 
ambiguity may help appeal to (or limited objections from) a wide range of actors ex ante, but 
requires continuous working out and renegotiation in particular local situations ex post.   
This chapter explores the role of ambiguity and creativity in processes of institutional 
change both theoretically and empirically.  The chapter first provides a theoretical discussion 
about ambiguity drawing upon recent sociological conceptions of action, and then relates 
ambiguity to the concept of institutions as “summary representation” of a strategic game (Aoki 
2001).  This concept is closely related to “typifications” where under certain conditions X, a 
particular type of actor Y is expected to do Z (Berger and Luckmann 1966), or generalized values 
that make diverse contingencies comparable across different situations and networks of actors 
(White 1992).  While institutions coordinate expectations, ambiguity may remain that poses an 
interpretive gap to be filled.  Actors may thus gain scope for strategic responses to institutions 
(Oliver 1991) that involve creative reinterpretation and redeployment for new purposes.   
Next, the chapter examines the role of ambiguity in the empirical case of German 
codetermination.  Codetermination refers to a complex set of legal and social institutions that 
shape employee participation in company decision making through works councils and 
                                                           
4 In economics, the concept of uncertainty refers to situations where the magnitude or value of 
an outcome is unknowable.  Ambiguity refers more specifically to situations where more than 
one interpretation is possible. Philosophers also distinguish ambiguity from vagueness where 
the meaning is not clear in context.    
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representation in the Supervisory Boards of large firms.  Since its origins in the 19
th Century, 
codetermination survived major economic shocks, as well as social and political upheaval.  But 
the continuity in formal legal rules contrasts with remarkable diversity as an organizational 
practice—over time, across industrial sectors and between individual firms.   
Initially, codetermination developed through state intervention into the private social 
order of the firm in effort to integrate employees, but also circumvent independent unions.  This 
political compromise resulted in a dual orientation of works councils to represent the interests of 
employees, but promote cooperation with management in the interests of the company.  This 
ambiguous role left many latent alternatives that could develop in different directions.  Unions 
first saw codetermination as a paternalistic firm based rival to industrial unionism, but later came 
to embrace and utilize codetermination to project union power onto the shop floor.  Likewise, 
management opposed codetermination, but later learned to use codetermination as a means to 
reduce post-war labor conflicts and improve employee commitment in support of Germany’s 
high-skill, high-quality manufacturing sector.  Recently the post-war compromise is being 
renegotiated again in light of new capital market pressures and corporate governance reforms.     
Codetermination illustrates how ambiguity originated in political compromise, but also 
how ambiguous agreement allows scope for institutional innovation.  Actors continue to contest 
the various boundaries of codetermination—between public intervention and private ordering; the 
scope of sectors and firms and issues subject to codetermination; or the balance between 
cooperation and interest representation within the firm.  Since ambiguity remains what 
codetermination is or should do, actors may pull institutions in different directions as new 
situations emerge.  This stretching of horizons involves new sorts of strategic behavior, including 
conflict over how rules are to be interpreted and renegotiation over how to apply them.  But 
rather than undergoing wholesale breakdown and replacement, codetermination has evolved in a 
very incremental fashion through what Thelen (2003) calls institutional “conversion.”  Ambiguity 
is thus central for understanding how codetermination was partially reproduced and partially 
changed over time. 
 
I.  Grounding Institutional Change in Pragmatic Social Action 
Institutional change presents a puzzle, in no small part, due to a rather “oversocialized” 
view of how institutions shape action.  If institutions are coercive, normative or cognitively  
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taken-for-granted rules that constrain action, how may actors change their relationships to those 
constraints in ways that transform institutions?
5  Institutions coordinate individual behavior as 
“summary representations” (Aoki 2001) or “typifications” (Berger and Luckmann 1966) or 
“values” generalized across situations (White 1992).  While institutions thus constrain action, 
substantial indeterminacy and situational ambiguity remain.  However, the gap between 
institutional constraint and intentional action has not been sufficiently explored within 
institutional theory.
6   
Indeterminacy and ambiguity are often neglected because most social science implicitly 
relies on a teleological conception of action.  In The Creativity of Action, German sociologist 
Hans Joas (1992) reviewed existing theories of action and demonstrates the predominance of 
means-ends schema for understanding of human intentionality.  Here action is conceived as the 
pursuit of preestablished ends or preferences that remain stable from context to context.  The 
perception of the world is given, and separate from our actions.  Actions are then “chosen” by 
their anticipated consequences—in what might be termed “portfolio models” of the actor 
(Whitford 2002). The rational choice variant postulates maximizing on a fixed order of 
preferences, but normative models also tend to only “tinker” with this view by widening the 
portfolio to include social norms. Both views take ends as given preferences, norms or 
worldviews exogenous to the framework.  The cognitive or practical model of action used 
recently in institutional theorizing (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) is potentially different, since 
action involves enacting preconceived and taken-for-granted worldviews.   Routines and taken-
for-granted concepts may constitute a “toolkit” for creative action.  Yet even this view brackets 
how individuals interpret and evaluate their choices in dialogue with situations.  Action is 
focused on the choice of appropriate means, and creative dimensions of human behavior remain 
unexplained.   
Alternatives to a teleological view of action are not yet well developed.  But pragmatist 
thinkers such as John Dewey and George Herbert Mead suggest important elements.  Drawing 
                                                           
5  Conceptualizing institutional change faces similar issues as the “duality” of structure and 
agency examined by Bourdieu (1990) and Giddens (1984), who focus on how actors and 
social structures exist in a dialectical relation of mutual influence (Sewell Jr.: 1992) 
6  I am not arguing here that all institutional theory is deterministic, rather only that the 
indeterminate aspects of institutional contexts have not been adequately examined and 
integrated within institutional theory.  
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upon their works, Joas (1992) suggests the concept of “situation” as a basic category. Our actions 
do not follow predefined ends, but particular “ends-in-view” emerge concretely out of situations. 
Ends-in-view are based on judgments and assumptions about the type of situation and the 
possible actions that flow from it. Conversely, the situation itself is not a fixed, objective given.  
Situations are interpreted and defined in relation to our capacities for action. Starting from the 
situation, action follows a series of various ends-in-view that remain relatively undefined at first, 
but are specified through on-going reinterpretation and decisions about means.  Actors test out 
and revise their courses of action as each end-in-view itself becomes a means for a further end-in-
view.  Means and ends flow in a continuous stream—the distinction between them is only an 
analytical and temporal one.  
Pragmatism matters for institutional theory because it reminds us of the potential 
ambiguity of institutions.  Pragmatism suggests an ongoing “reorganization and reconstitution of 
habits and institutions” occurs in dialogue with new and changing situations (Joas 1992: 24). 
Institutions are just one element of a situation, and actors pull institutions in different directions 
within this horizon through acts of problem solving.  Institutional rules do not anticipate every 
contingency, and actors initially imagine only a limited set of the potential ends to which an 
institution can be used.  No one-to-one relationship exists between an institution and its meaning 
in a specific situation (Friedland and Alford 1991: 255).  Exploring and achieving these meanings 
through interpretation also opens institutions to active political contestation (Zilber 2002). 
Ambiguity thus involves perceived discrepancies between a problem situation and 
institutionalized rules or routines.  But unlike uncertainty or vagueness, ambiguity suggests 
institutions can take on two or more specific meanings.  Such multiplicity of meanings is 
commonplace as institutions become part of changed situational horizons and ends-in-view.   
Ambiguous contexts allow scope for creative action through processes of iteration, projection and 
evaluation (Emirbayer and Mische 1998).
7 Just as well-crafted ambiguity is central for literary 
metaphor, it is also a powerful catalyst for creativity is social contexts.  Creativity is not a 
mysterious leap as often implied. Rather, creativity is a bounded process that arises from practical 
                                                           
7   Iteration involves actors’ variable relation to past events through selective attention, 
recognition of types, categorization, shifting repertoires of action, and “repair” of violated 
expectations. Projection involves actors’ variable relation to projected future scenarios—
anticipation of events, construction of narrative, hypothetical resolution to dilemmas, or 
experimental enactment.  The practical-evaluative dimension involves actors’ variable relation 
to the present through the characterizing experience, deliberation, decision, and execution.  
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situations, but transcends them through contingency, reflexive intentionality and experimentation 
(Beckert 2002: 269-281).  Actors may thereby reinterpret and adapt institutions to suit new 
purposes—what Thelen (2003) calls institutional conversion. 
 
II.  Ambiguity and Institutional Change 
To elaborate on the above point, I first introduce a framework for institutional analysis 
proposed by Masahiko Aoki (2001).  This framework incorporates elements of rational/economic 
approaches and cognitive/sociological approaches to institutions.  It also highlights 
institutionalization as a dynamic process of reproduction, disruption and responses to disruption 
(Clemens and Cook 1999). 
In his game-theoretic framework, Aoki (2001: 202) defines institutions as a “compressed, 
commonly perceived representation of ways in which a game is played.”  His definition builds 
from feedback mechanisms represented by the COASE box whose four elements are 
reconstructed in Figure I (Aoki 2001: 203-206).  Subjective expectations (E) about the behavior 
of other actors coordinate the strategic choices of individual agents (S).  This allows individuals 
to economize on information, while their choices are thereby constrained.  As expectations are 
shared and serve as stable guides for strategy, collective behavior comes to confirm and reinforce 
such expectations about others` strategic choices.  Institutions also have consequences (CO) 
within a given technological and institutional environment that constrain the sets of feasible 
actions (A) and shape the capacities for action accumulated by actors.    
For Aoki (2001: 231), institutional change “... may be identified with a situation where 
agents` beliefs on the ways a game is played are altered in critical mass...In effect, understanding 
the process of institutional change may be tantamount to understanding the ways in which the 
agents revise their beliefs in a coordinated manner”.  A “cognitive disequilibrium” emerges 
between expectations and actual outcomes. Actors question their expectations, perceive existing 
capacities as inadequate and seek new strategies. Disequilibrium may be triggered by 
consequences (CO) of environmental change such as war, financial market collapse, rising costs 
of the welfare state, etc. Or changed capacities for action (A) may alter strategic options.   New 
capacities may result from learning or accumulation of power.  Capacities may also be lost due to 
exposure to competition or generational change, thereby exhausting preconditions for past 
strategies.  Institutional change begins as actors begin to experiment with, learn or emulate new  
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strategies (S).  New strategies may remain marginal.  But beyond a certain scale, shared beliefs 
(E) undergo a crisis and face competition with other beliefs.   
A narrow reading of the COASE box might equate a given objective set of consequences 
and capacities with a given institutional equilibrium.  The term “equilibrium” seems to denote a 
discrete and stable state, whereas change occurs through the breakdown of one equilibrium and 
replacement with another.  However, Aoki (2001: 243) cautions against drawing too stark a 
contrast between periods of stability and transition.  Aoki stresses a subjective notion of games 
wherein institutions are a focal point around which a range of behavior emerges.  Here 
expectations (E) involve both shared cognition and private beliefs.  Consequences (CO) are not 
objectively known, but only inferred by actors and may therefore be unintended.  Capacities for 
action (A) are only a subset of all technologically feasible actions based on active repertoires.  
And strategies (S) are based on incomplete information that may be revised through information 
gathering.  While these features appear as exogenous and fixed in the short-term, they must be 
considered variable in the long run because they can be incrementally altered through the 
operation of the institution itself (Greif 2004).  Unintended consequences accumulate, repertoires 
for action evolve, and new information leads to strategic experiments that challenge 
institutionalized expectations.   
When seen in action-theoretic terms, institutions represent situations in a summary form 
that must remain loose enough to be transposable across situations, but specific enough to allow 
actors to mobilize efforts of control in enforcing an institution (White 1992).  Institutions often 
remain ambiguous.  More than one set of behaviors may be consistent with an institution.  One 
strong implication is that institutionalization is not a discrete state, but a matter of degree 
(Jepperson 1991). In the extreme, Erving Goffman (1961) used the metaphor of a “total 
institution” where all situations are governed by an institution and action is only possible 
“backstage” through deviations in the performance of fixed roles.  But while some institutions 
may be rigidly prescriptive (actors “must” follow a certain rule), others may establish more 
limited boundaries of what is not possible (actors “must not” do something), and others may 
provide only loose models around which actors engage in substantial improvisation (Crawford 
and Ostrom 1995).  Allowing for the ambiguous nature of “summary representations” within the 
COASE framework helps us understand how institutional change may occur through incremental 
modification, rather than breakdown and replacement of equilibrium outcomes.  
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Reinterpretation and Conversion (E & S):  Within the COASE framework, expectations 
or values (E) coordinate strategic choices (S).  Institutions rest on expectations and values about 
how actors behave in a range of situations. Yet different degrees of ambiguity confront actors as 
they attempt to enact institutionalized behaviors or pursue new ends-in-view at the boundaries of 
institutions.  Ambiguity arises as situational contexts shift and create questions about how 
expectations apply to a particular situation or whether a strategy is actually consistent with 
expected norms or values. Such ambiguity may remain local and without any impact on the 
institution. 
However, ambiguity may also become more global to an institution as a result of repeated 
collisions or tensions among different “faces” of an institution. While institutions are defined as 
“shared beliefs” or “common understandings,” Aoki (2001: 202) also mentions how “the variety 
of meanings attached to an established institution by agents in different roles may be identified as 
ideologies”.  Conflict is often built into institutions. Interpretation is not merely a technical issue, 
but involves a micro-politics where underlying conflicts of interest may lead to contention across 
different groups.    If institutions are capable of being understood in more than one way, gaps 
between institutionalized expectation (e.g. rule or value) and strategic action must be filled by 
creative interpretation, application and enactment.  Actors must test out different courses of 
action, and these may lead to the mutability or reinterpretation of an institution (Clemens and 
Cook 1999: 448) or the conversion of institutions to new ends and purposes (Thelen 2003). The 
implications of ambiguity will be briefly discussed in relation to the consequences of institutional 
interdependence (CO) and the capacities of actors (A). 
Reconfiguration (CO):  A non-teleological perspective implies that action has multiple 
effects that are hard to estimate ex ante.  Institutions gain autonomy to the degree that 
contingencies and consequences can be externalized from the action context across a boundary of 
two institutional domains.  But any institution exists within a complex environment of where the 
consequences (CO) of one institution constitute the environment for another institution to 
different degrees.
8  Recent work uses the concept of institutional complementarities to describe 
re-enforcing properties, where one institution becomes more viable give the presence of a 
                                                           
8 As Sewell (1992: 16) argues, “... a theory of change cannot be built into a theory of structure 
unless we adopt a far more multiple, contingent, and fractured conception of society—and of 




corresponding institution elsewhere (Aoki 2001, Hall and Soskice 2001, Milgrom and Roberts 
1995).  But what may be a functional in one domain may lead to dysfunction in another.   
Institutional tensions may arise that destabilize or disrupt the reproduction of another institution.  
Institutions often embody conflicting principles of rationality, as stressed within Weberian 
sociology (Lepsius 1990, Sewell 1992: 16-19). Of course, contradictory principles may 
sometimes serve to balance inherent weaknesses, such as institutionalized power sharing between 
property rights and employee codetermination (Dahrendorf’s “institutionalized class conflict”), 
majority rule and constitutional rule of law, or free markets and product regulation. 
We can refer to changing relationships between different institutions generally as 
institutional reconfiguration.
9  The concepts of “unintended fit” between institutions (Aoki 1997) 
or “unintended consequences” reflect the mutual adjustment of institutions as an ongoing 
processes needed to reduce ambiguities, debug frictions and establish satisfactory performance.  
Institutional tensions may provoke modification, adaptation and repair of an institution.  But 
often tensions exert strong contradictory pressures that lead political actors or organizations to 
deal with institutional dilemmas by dealing with one “face” of the problem at a time, while 
exacerbating another “face” whose consequences will have to dealt with later in time—
sometimes beyond the lifetime of those actors.  These all represent potential endogenous 
dynamics for institutional change. 
Changing capacities for action (A) may produce institutional change even under broadly 
stable institutional rules.  Stark (2001) uses the term “ambiguous assets” to describe how existing 
resources may be used to new ends.  Likewise, cognitive schemas may be transposed to new 
situations. Institutions also vest power that becomes a means to new ends.  The incorporation of 
new groups into an institution may thus introduce new capacities for action unforeseen when the 
institution was created (Thelen 2003). Finally, emergent processes such as experimentation, 
learning and emulation may all lead to new organizational or individual capacities (Levitt and 
March 1988).  While capacities are often seen as skills and resources, a broader discussion might 
also include values as a capacity for institutionalizing behavior.  Values arise in experiences of 
                                                           
9  Aoki discusses reconfiguration through geographic integration or segmentation of domains 
(e.g protectionism, internationalization, etc.), or where organizations strategically integrate or 




self-formation and self-transcendence that lead to enduring modifications of the self—both 
through positive and negative experiences (Joas 1997).  While non-economic value commitments 
may become important elements of economic institutions, their instrumentalization in service of 
utilitarian aims may erode those very values.  Here the experiential basis of those value 
commitments fails to be reproduced, and cannot be reproduced on the basis on rational utilitarian 
calculation alone. 
In sum, ambiguity plays an important role in understanding how institutions may be 
reproduced in varied ways.  Ambiguity implies an interpretative gap between situations and 
institutions.  But unlike the breakdown implied by “cognitive disequilibrium,” ambiguity stresses 
the potential scope for creative reinterpretation and innovative deployment of institutions for new 
ends-in-view.  The COASE framework points to different sources of ambiguity.  Ambiguity may 
be local and situational, but may also result from reinterpretation through diverse ideological 
lenses or contention over institutionalized compromises.  Ambiguity may also result from efforts 
to adjust institutions to changed consequences of its institutional environment, resulting in a 
reconfiguration across different institutional domains.  And changing capacities may lead to 
reinterpretation of institutions in light of changed values or new resources for action.  Whether 
such variation leads to “institutional change” depends on a critical mass.
10  
III.  Institutional Change:  The Case of Codetermination in Germany 
  This section turns to an empirical examination of ambiguity in the case of German 
codetermination.  German codetermination displays remarkable continuities since the 19
th 
Century.  Yet the stability of legal rules contrasts with its diversity as a social institution that has 
co-evolved with shifts in ideas, power relationships and coalition building among company 
stakeholders (Jackson 2001).  This section presents only a brief historical sketch to highlight 
some theoretical themes.  
  Codetermination rests on a contradictory imperative.  Works councils should represent the 
interests of employees, while pursuing peaceful cooperation with management in the interests of 
the firm.  This duality has made codetermination a highly ambiguous, but remarkably adaptable 
institution.  The balance between representation and cooperation has undergone shifts in response 
to new economic demands and socio-political circumstances. New constellations of actors 
                                                           
10 The question of defining thresholds to conceptualize institutional emergence or 
deinstitutionalization remains beyond the scope of this chapter.    
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emerged, and led to contention and reinterpretation of codetermination.  As shall be discussed 
below, the history of codetermination can thus be divided into several distinct phases as a 
repressive paternalistic institution, a platform of revolutionary socialism, an element of political 
democratization and social partnership, and a style of co-management shaping how German firms 
adapt to international capital market pressures (See Figure II). 
Political Origins of Ambiguity (Imperial and Weimar Germany).  The idea of 
‘codetermination’ (Mitbestimmung) arose in the mid-19
th Century having complex roots in 
Christian, socialist, and romantic philosophies, as well as the notion of parity (Parität) and 
economic democracy (Teuteberg 1961, 1981).  Codetermination represented a socially integrative 
alternative to revolution or socialism, but had different meanings to different people. Employees 
framed codetermination as a demand for “industrial citizenship” often analogous to constitutional 
rights in politics.  Employers saw it as a paternalistic practice that used employee representation 
in company welfare schemes as a way to foster employee loyalty.   
An increasingly nonliberal German state (Lehmbruch 2001) used codetermination as a 
strategy of intervention to co-opt labor with the goal of circumventing unions and dampening 
political support for socialism.  Following the 1889 coal mining strike and the rise of the Social 
Democrats in the 1890 Reichstag elections, commercial code reforms gave workers’ committees 
limited consultation rights in 1891. Following another strike in 1905, the state required the work 
rules of the mines to have consent from a workers committee (Weisbrod 1989).
11   These 
committees restricted employer prerogatives, but also circumvented independent labor unions.  
Councils gained little acceptance among management, who clung to autocratic and paternalist 
models of authority captured by the phrase Herr im Haus (Braun et al. 1992: 193-198). Unions 
likewise retained an ambivalent stance.   
During World War I, wartime “industrial truce” integrated the Social Democrats and labor 
unions into national politics (Feldman 1966).  Employee mobility was restricted within war-
related industries, and the state scrambled to maintain order in industrial production.  The Patrial 
Auxiliary Service Law of 1916 mandated elected workers’ committees that held rights for 
consultation regarding the “demands, wishes and complaints of the work force with regard to the 
                                                           
11 Coal mining was important in developing a model for codetermination, because the legacy of 
direct state control over the mines made employment relations a concern of the public interest 
(Berg: 1984, Fischer: 1974, 142).  
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factory, wage and other employment conditions and the social welfare policy of the firm” 
(Teuteberg 1961: 511). The controversial law gave councils more power than anticipated because 
the War Ministry was directly involved with the mediation of disputes.  To avoid binding 
decisions by the state, employers sought co-operation with councils. 
Following the war, conflicting views of codetermination existed.  Employers saw councils 
as a temporary wartime institution, whereas union demanded for their extension. Here the 
changing political circumstances help put works councils on a new footing—specifically, the 
revolutionary council movement and political democracy of the Weimar state.  The new state 
sought to limit the revolutionary council movement by institutionalizing a less radical version. 
Codetermination was a right anchored in the Weimar constitution and the Works Councils Law 
(Betriebsrätegesetz) passed in 1920.  The law mandated the formation of works councils with 
parity representation of blue- and white-collar employees in all establishments with over 20 
employees. The supplementary law passed in 1922 allowed the works council to also send two 
employee representatives to the Supervisory Board.   
The law contained many features of contemporary codetermination: the obligation toward 
peaceful cooperation of the works council in the interests of the firm, the separation of collective 
bargaining from the activities of works councils, and codecision rights in personnel affairs of the 
firm. The works council had a “dual” role in representing the independent interests of workers 
while supporting the business interests of the employer (Fuerstenberg 1958). Unions made sure 
that works councils did not engage in collective bargaining, while employers sought the 
obligation to cooperation.  From the mid-1920s, works councils spread to around half of all plants 
with over 50 employees (Plumpe 1992).  Yet despite their new footing, works councils remained 
a somewhat weak institution.  A seminal article by Kurt Brigl-Matthiass (1926) documents the 
highly ambiguous social context of Weimar works councils which faced contradictory pressures 
from three conflicting “faces” of codetermination—as representatives of rank-and-file employees, 
as part of the broader labor movement alongside political parties and industry-wide unions, and in 
their legal relationship of cooperation with management.  
First, works councils faced strong pressures to respond to the material interests of rank 
and file workers due to election rules, short terms in office and close social contact. To maintain 
legitimacy, works councilors were pressured to take even “irrational” demands of employees to 
the management.  Conflictual tactics were often employed to demonstrate independence from  
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management, even when cooperation with management was clearly needed.  These shop floor 
pressures also created tension with unions.  The “opportunistic” rules negotiated with shop floor 
management to gain small benefits within the system often contradicted the broader political and 
solidaristic goals of unions. The position of works councils is much more dependent on the 
economic situation of the firm than industrial unions, and made councils more likely to cooperate 
with management.  Unions consequently remained ambivalent toward works councils, which they 
saw as a possible source of “syndicalism” that would undermine union discipline and capacity for 
multi-employer collective bargaining.  
  Second, works councils remained part of the political labor movement aimed at 
transforming the political and economic order.  Many councilors were members of socialist 
political parties, and often the large works councils were factionalized along party lines.   
Councils spread socialist political propaganda within the company, and sometimes attempted to 
restrict management authority in the name of socialist workers` democracy. Where works 
councils become more politicized, their focus moved away from the pragmatic goals of shaping 
working conditions and created a wide gap with the business concerns of management. 
Trade union agendas also played an important role in coordinating works council 
demands across firms—for example, opposition to overtime in order to realize the 8 hour work 
day. Unions also provided auxiliary support through economic and legal advice. Such linkages 
with trade unions were crucial in giving works councils a greater capacity for independence from 
management.  Despite increasing educational opportunities for the working classes through 
Volkshochschulen and popular publications, lack of education greatly limited the capacity of 
works councils given their insufficient knowledge to make informed judgments about business 
and legal matters. 
Third, the internal and external relations of works councils influenced the capacity of 
works councils to make credible commitments in cooperating with company management. 
Employers had politically opposed the Works Council Law, but their experiences with the 
councils were mixed (Plumpe 1992: 43-55). Political turmoil and the rise of social democracy 
made labor the single reliable bargaining power. Some employers learned to use the works 
council as an instrument of constructive communication within the firm.  Works councils served 
as a vent for employee unrest and helped renew the legitimacy of management following the 
breakdown of authority following the war. Lesser industrial conflict came at the price of  
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increased negotiations and smaller conflicts on a daily basis.  Elsewhere, steel firms and 
employers’ associations continued strong opposition, particularly to board representation, and 
sought to discourage cooperative relations between firms and works councils.  
Codetermination thus developed through a state strategy to co-opt labor in the absence of 
political democracy.  But codetermination built on a wide array of cultural frames and was 
interpreted by key actors through the lens of very divergent values: company loyalty, the firm as 
family or community, or codetermination as negotiation among independent parties.  The 
emerging institution remained ideologically charged and its role highly ambiguous.   During 
Weimar, the growing independence of the labor movement did not lead to the end of 
codetermination, but its reinterpretation.  Works councils were liberated from their paternalist 
origins, but many of their internal and external contradictions were sharpened.  Shop floor 
constituents, unions, and management all pulled works councils in different directions.  Works 
councils remained based on very uneasy compromises, rather than consensus about their 
legitimate role. Codetermination resulted in a wide diversity of practices spanning from 
pragmatic cooperation to extreme distrust.  This social experiment was then interrupted as the 
Nazi regime eliminated organized labor and reorganized councils as new ‘councils of trust’ based 
on the notion of organic relations between firm and employees as part of a coerced national 
community.   
Democratization and Social Partnership (1945-1960s).  After the Nazi period, 
codetermination reemerged during postwar democratization. Codetermination found new political 
legitimacy by being reinterpreted in light of Nazism and post-war reconstruction.  While key actors 
continued to have different visions of codetermination, codetermination stood in a somewhat less 
ambiguous relationship to the existing social and economic order.  The door was opened to 
substantial institutional innovation beyond the legacies of pre-war codetermination. 
The first councils arose spontaneously during the immediate aftermath of the war.  Their 
activities concerned the immediate reconstruction and reopening of production plants, as well as 
housing and rationing of food.  Employers did not oppose council efforts to assist in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. Labor was sometimes able to gain representation in the 
Supervisory Board and elect a labor director to the management board.  Many council members 
were anti-fascist or communist party members who created personal continuities with the 
Weimar works councils, influencing their early capabilities and ideological bents.  
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Meanwhile, employers contemplated how to deal with the councils in the absence of legal 
norms.  The 1920 works council law was an important reference point and signified the 
maximum scope of rights (Mueller 1987: 76-85).  A variety of models emerged in practice, 
particularly concerning board representation.  Unions were cautious in taking a stance. After 12 
years of illegality, German unions scrambled to rebuild themselves.  They could not easily return 
to their political program of the Weimar era, although concepts such as ‘democratization of the 
economy’ or ‘codetermination’ reappeared.  Socialism played a continued role, but was 
supplemented by a broader aim to prevent the political abuse of economic power in war-related 
industries. Union thus had an ambiguous set of positions, aiming to both transform the existing 
economic order and participate in the existing order through codetermination.  This ambiguity 
itself helped the left achieve consensus by speaking in general terms to its various factions, while 
allowing a wide range of policies to be legitimated ex post.  
The Allies intervened to encourage works councils in the coal and steel industry through 
the Control Council Law (KRG) in 1946.  Due to differing positions among the Allied authorities, 
the law only vaguely defined rights and duties. Ambiguities were later worked out by negotiated 
agreements. Rights were substantially expanded in firms with strong union presence, while 
weaker firms fell behind the standard of the 1920 law.  A key question was how to interpret the 
KRG Paragraph 22 (Mueller 1987: 94-101).  Unions sought a legal guarantee for boardroom 
representation and participation in economic affairs.  However, employers saw this interpretation 
as too broad, since the law did not specify limits.  Many employers opposed council demands for 
representation within the supervisory and management boards.  Employers associations feared 
that generous agreements at particular firms might set precedents that would place unwanted 
pressure to expand codetermination rights. While the unions also supported uniform legal rights 
in principle, strategically they hoped firm-level agreements would create facts that positively 
affected legal developments.   
Meanwhile, a separate solution developed in the iron and steel industry.  In August 1946, 
the Allies took direct control of the sector through the North German Iron and Steel Control 
(NGISC).  The Allies planned to break-up the industry into some 30 new firms to avoid the 
concentration of economic power among industrialists (who had supported the Nazis) in this 
militarily important industry. NGISC faced the issue of membership in the Supervisory Boards in 
these newly created companies. Here the British authorities sought to employee representation  
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into the boards as a balance of power in the absence of a functioning German state and given the 
mistrust of industrialists.  Some employers supported these practices by entering into pragmatic 
alliances with the works councils in an effort to stall plans for further dismantling or socialization of 
industry.  
These practices later influenced national legislation.  In 1950, the West German state was 
established and firms again fell under German corporate law, which provided no codetermination 
rights. The metalworkers’ union called for a strike in 1951, leading to the involvement of Chancellor 
Adenauer in brokering Law on Codetermination in the Mining and Iron and Steel Industries 
(Montanmitbestimmung).   The law mandated the parity model of Supervisory Board within the 
coal and steel industries.  Even here, however, the boundaries of the Montan model remained 
sharply contested (Teuteberg 1981: 58-60).  In 1953, legal conflicts about the application to holding 
companies erupted. The 1958 “Luedenscheid Agreement” used private works agreements to 
contractually preserve codetermination rights where independent companies were reintegrated into 
parent companies.  And in 1967 and 1971, laws were passed that aimed to prevent the defection of 
particular firms from the Montan model.  Meanwhile, other sectors followed a weaker model as 
unions proved unable to realize their demands due to opposition by the liberal coalition partner 
(Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) and employers.  The 1952 Works Constitution Act mandated 
only one-third of Supervisory Board seats for labor, more limited rights for works councils and no 
provisions for a labor director in the management board.  
Despite the success of the Montan model, employees interpreted this institution in diverse 
ways (Popitz et al. 1957: 156-163).  Interviews of steel workers from the 1950s show a high 
degree of indifference and resignation toward codetermination—few practical effects were 
perceived and workers remained skeptical about the development of durable codetermination as 
the post-war crisis receded.  Furthermore, socialist workers rejected codetermination as a 
detrimental compromise.  Only about one-third of workers reported a positive evaluation of 
codetermination.  These workers perceived codetermination in pragmatic terms, but did relate 
participation in the workplace to greater societal and political democracy.   Their values were 
closely related to their experiences in the post-war reconstruction of factories (p.177).  More so 
than political ideologies or agendas, this collective memory was decisive for establishing the 
legitimacy of codetermination for this generation.  
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The Montan sectors also proved to be highly innovative in applying the rules in ways that 
influenced the further development of codetermination.  The formal legal rights stronger, and 
management and labor were also able to develop new capacities through dense social networks.  
These social networks outside the firm were important in promoting learning effects, stabilizing 
expectations, and generating new organizational capacities.  On the management side, a working 
group developed among the personnel department staff from various establishments and 
enterprises.  This group had 25 to 30 members meeting twice a month, plus convening with the 
union for two days a year. The union also became progressively less hostile to works councils 
and promoted them as an “extended arm” of unionism within the factory.  Specifically, unions 
provided extensive legal and educational services to works council members, helping to upgrade 
their competence on economic issues.  The regional office of the IG Metall also played an 
important role as the sources of nominations for labor directors.  As the industry faced crisis and 
decline in the 1970s, this strong local culture of cooperation proved to the source of extremely 
innovative employment adjustment policies that relied on a strong co-management role of works 
councils in negotiating new practices.  Many negotiated rights were incorporated in later national 
legislation. 
  Diffusion and Consolidation in the 1970s and 1980s. As the post-war generation began to 
retire, a new younger generation began to emerge as shop stewards and union activists in the late 
1960s.  These stewards challenged the practices of the works councils in attempt to ‘risk more 
democracy’ within the economic sphere.  Unlike works councils, local union branches and shop 
stewards had no obligation to uphold cooperation with management.  Old conflicts reemerged as 
to whether the labor movement was limited to industrial relations or a society-wide political 
movement.  These challenges from below coincided with peak employment in the German steel 
industry during 1974 and subsequent period of declining employment.   
Meanwhile, sharply contested reforms in 1972 under the Social Democratic Party formalized 
new rights for works councils (Thelen 1991), and a 1976 revision widened Supervisory Board 
representation, although it remained weaker than the coal and steel model.  Substantial gaps 
remained between legal principles and organizational practices, leaving substantial ambiguity and 
heterogeneity across firms. Unions had to struggle at the shop floor level to implement the works 
council law.  A landmark study by Kotthoff (1994) compared the same group of 55 firms in 
1974/75 and 1989/90, and examined the continuity and change in the role of works councils.   
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Striking evidence was that 53% of the firms having deficient interest representation in 1975 had 
moved toward to a more effective and cooperative pattern by 1990.  Consequently, the proportion 
of firms with effective interest representation increased from one-third to two-thirds.   
Even more revealing are the patterns of change.  The largest change was among firms 
having works councils under control of a paternalistic management.  Here, 12 of the 16 firms 
developed more autonomous and effective works councils.  By contrast, “isolated” works 
councils were reproduced in 6 of 9 firms. Here, authoritarian styles of management remained 
unchanged.  In only 2 cases were works councils able to develop greater influence, but through 
aggressive opposition rather than cooperative negotiation. Kotthoff also points out interesting 
dynamics at firms with effective works councils in 1975.  One typical pattern was a period of 
stagnation and growing irrelevance of works councils, followed by a revitalization that 
crystallized around economic crisis and changes of management or works council personnel.  But 
the most common pattern among larger firms was the consolidation of codetermination based on 
close informal cooperation.  Cooperation depends strongly on the personal relationships between 
the labor director and the head of the works council.  Whereas the dual role of the works councils 
as employee representative and as co-manager is ambiguous, it is continuously renegotiated in a 
very thick local context of inter-personal trust. 
The patterns of change show that codetermination, as a formal legal institution, depends 
closely on how it is socially embedded within patterns of social exchange (e.g. paternalism).  
This social context is where the ambiguities of the legal doctrine are interpreted and worked out 
in practice terms.  As Kottoff notes: 
 
‘…the patriarchic and paternalistic forms of social order within the factory, which are so common 
in Germany, were a key prerequisite for transforming conflicts over industrial citizenship into a 
form of cooperation oriented by the notion of `codetermination`…In factories with more 
instrumental forms of social order, conflict did not lead to such cooperation, but to spirals of 
distrust and continuous confrontation.’ (Kotthoff 1994: 180 own translation GJ). 
 
Once established, the stability of codetermination also shows how the ambiguity of an institution 
may support the stability of that institution in the face of external change.  Works councils were 
able to shield themselves from internal challenges and factionalism among the employees, but  
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also avoid co-optation by the management that would render it ineffective.  Strong personal 
authority and reputation of the works councilors can help legitimate tough management decisions 
among employees, but management must honor this also making real concessions.  The 
ambiguous ‘dual’ mandate gives important flexibility for compromise, but social capital must 
first be built up to give actors capacities for informal social exchange.   
The same importance of social embeddedness applies to the labor director 
(Arbeitsdirektor), particularly union-appointed directors in Montan industries.  The labor director 
also has a dual task in representing management, while maintaining the trust of the union and 
works council. However, if the director favors labor and thereby becomes weak within the board, 
works councils will not perceive the director as a credible and trustworthy bargaining partner.  
The complexity of this social milieu places great demands on social skill.  Works councilors 
often point out big differences in the individual qualities of labor directors.  Thus, strong labor 
directors and strong works councils reinforce each other in a positive-sum manner, but each side 
paradoxically depends on the other side not giving into all their demands.  These checks and 
balances represent a greater social capacity for problem solving.   
The diverse patterns of codetermination exist in apparent contention with the fact that 
codetermination is nearly universally considered to be a stable institution in Germany.  Works 
councils remain unrivaled as the means of interest representation within the firm, and enjoy a 
high rate of diffusion.  But their institutionalization is fraught with challenges. As works councils 
were recognized by employers and accumulated competence in economic affairs, 
codetermination took on many new functions and underwent substantial professionalization.   
Works councils became less deeply embedded within the lifeworld of employees (e.g. lesser 
input legitimacy), but gained importance in economic governance and the management of 
employment adjustment (e.g. higher output legitimacy)—particularly in industries such as mining 
and steel, which were strongholds of labor but underwent massive technical rationalization. 
The Ambiguity of Codetermination and Institutional Change.  In sum, codetermination 
was fraught with substantial ambiguity from its early days.  During different periods, 
codetermination was deployed to legitimate or enable a very wide range of actions.   
Codetermination subsequently developed many different “faces” as it was pulled in different 
directions—both in political and economic terms. Politically, codetermination was a compromise, 
resulting from particular state strategies to repress organized labor, employer strategies to  
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maintain a paternalistic authority, and employee strategies to democratize the workplace and 
establish rights of industrial citizenship. Works councils emerged having a “dual” mandate to 
represent the interests of employees and cooperate in the interests of the firm.   
Over time, works councils became increasingly cooperation as codetermination took on a 
growing scope of economic ad regulatory functions. However, this required reducing a tension 
existed between the broader agenda of German industrial unions and the firm-specific interests of 
core employees. These tensions were held in check during the 1970s and 1980s, as unions 
developed capacities to support works councils as a useful extension of their collective aims.  
Independent unions also strengthened the internal bargaining power of works councils and 
employee representatives to the Supervisory board.  However, as well shall see, corporate 
governance reforms since the mid-1990s have swung the pendulum back toward greater tensions 
given the greater risks and rewards for firms facing capital market pressures.   
Ironically, the very ambiguity of codetermination ex ante seems to have allowed 
flexibility in adaptation to new circumstances ex post.  Codetermination cannot be equated with a 
specific set of strategic ends or outcomes, but rather a long series of ends-in-view interpreted 
through a particular shared (albeit ambiguous and contested) set of values.  Over time 
codetermination was put to new purposes—“institutional conversion.” And only by transforming 
itself in this way was codetermination sustained as an institution.  Change often involved 
reconfiguration in light of new institutional and economic environments—such as the emergence 
of political democracy, industrial unionism, or the internationalization of capital markets.   
Learning new capacities for action among local networks of actors were important in filling the 
large gap between codetermination as legal doctrine and an economically beneficial institution of 
workplace and corporate governance that could be imitated more broadly. For example, 
innovative norms and practices diffused from coal and steel firms to the rest of the German 
corporate economy. 
The evolution of codetermination suggests institutional change that falls short of crisis or 
collapse. Codetermination has never given rise to a uniform set of organizational practices.   
Many local variations or “styles” of codetermination developed as broad ambiguous 
institutionalized values were worked out in different local contexts.  But this variation in local 





IV.  Codetermination under Shareholder Value: Change since the 1990s 
The discussion of the post-war era showed that codetermination was no longer seen as an 
instrument for transforming the economic system into a mixture of capitalist and socialist 
elements (Wirtschaftsdemokratie). Unions accepted that codetermination operates in firms whose 
goal is to generate cash flows and earnings. Codetermination came to be interpreted and 
legitimate itself not only in terms of values of democracy and social inclusion, but increasingly as 
an efficient model for organizing employment relationships.  In terms of its dual mandate, an 
evolution took place from cooperation to representation, and back to a qualitatively new form of 
cooperation where both sides see themselves more as partners than as opponents in class 
confrontation.  The scope of codetermination thus moved beyond its legal foundations in social 
and personal issues to include a wider scope of economic issues that blur boundaries between 
management functions and codetermination. The 1998 report of the Codetermination 
Commission (Mitbestimmung 1998) documents the high degree of legitimacy and positive effects 
of codetermination on social integration and economic cooperation.
12   
While the story of codetermination often ends here, recent trends show that 
codetermination has continued to change.   Since the late 1980s, German capital markets have 
undergone substantial liberalization and these prompted substantial reforms in corporate 
governance since the mid-1990s (see the chapter by Deeg in this volume).  These trends include 
the weakening of traditional bank monitoring, growth in new institutional investors, expansion of 
equity-based finance and the opening of the market for corporate control (Jackson 2003). 
Changes in corporate governance institutions have strong implications for codetermination, and 
have led to growing tensions and institutional reconfiguration. 
Historically, codetermination evolved as an element of “organized capitalism” alongside a 
dense network between banks and large industrial firms.  German banks, family owners or inter-
firm holdings all represented patient capital that could live with codetermination as long as it 
delivered cooperation and quality production in the long-run, even if decision making and 
employment adjustment were slower and more costly. But new types of investors face more 
                                                           
12 This section does not discuss the issue of institutional transfer of codetermination to East 
Germany following German unification. Nor do I discuss legal reforms in areas such as 
environmental regulation and discrimination confronted works councils with new tasks and led 
to a further expansion of their activities.  
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short-term pressures.  Institutional investors focus more exclusively on financial returns, rather 
than underwriting inter-firm cooperation.  In addition, regulatory changes have strengthened 
shareholder rights and promoted greater transparency and disclosure in decision-making.   
Reforms have also enabled greater capital market-orientation by removing past restrictions on 
managerial stock options, share buy-backs, share swaps and other uses of equity.  This pattern of 
reform fits well to the concept of institutional layering (see Introduction), since legislation has not 
sought to directly reform Supervisory Board codetermination but enable boards to engage in new 
behaviors or follow new social norms embodied in voluntary codes of conduct rather than law.   
As a result, many large corporations have adopted new strategies to promote shareholder-
value.  As a criterion of business rationality, shareholder value runs contrary to the normative 
legitimacy of participation rights and sharing of organizational rents that characterize 
codetermined firms.  That is, their logics appear incompatible, at least in principle.  The symbolic 
claims for shareholder primacy have rarely been used as a direct challenge to codetermination 
given the legal anchoring of codetermination rights.  However, the implications of shareholder 
value for business strategy confront codetermination with new economic problems that typically 
provoke conflicts: 
•  focus on core competencies creates conflicts with employees over the definition of core 
business units and strategies of growth by diversification used to stabilize employment. 
Divestment from noncore units raises issues of finding good buyers who honor existing 
employment agreements. 
•  Ending cross-subsidization of business units and establishing equity-oriented performance 
targets create conflicts over performance criteria, profitability hurdles, time horizons, and 
disciplining poorly performing units. Greater independence of business units may weaken 
solidarity among employees being more directly exposed to market risks and rewards. 
•  Performance-oriented pay raises issues of balancing individual and group incentives, defining 
performance criteria, and the risks of contingent pay. Managerial stock options provoked 
controversy over income inequality and short-termism. 
•  Increased disclosure and market-oriented accounting may conflict with buffering risks 
through internal reserves and favor higher distribution of profits to shareholders. However, 




Several recent studies document the role of codetermination under shareholder-value 
(Hoepner and Jackson 2001, Hoepner 2001, Hoepner 2003, Jackson et al. 2004).  In many ways 
strong ambiguities exist between codetermination and shareholder value that have left much 
leeway for mutual adjustment in practice. Works councils may retain their basis of power through 
continued cooperation with management, while minimizing the negative impact on core 
employees (Kotthoff 1998).  Cooperative works councils may promote a relatively enlightened or 
incremental and long-term approach to corporate restructuring that helps curtail excessive short-
term pressures.  But these continuities also bring change. Managers are using this cooperation to 
new ends and thereby modifying the functions of codetermination in light of capital market 
pressures and changing boundaries of firms. 
For example, corporate restructuring during the 1990s resulted in a modest redistribution 
of corporate wealth from employees to shareholders (Beyer and Hassel 2002). Shareholder value 
strategies favor lower rates of internal growth and declining employment, while raising targeted 
return on investment. Management negotiated adjustment by maintaining but modifying 
commitments to core employees, while allowing the core of stable employment to shrink.  This 
compromise resulted in the increased used of negotiated employment adjustment and benevolent 
methods such as natural fluctuation, early retirement, part time work, etc.
13  Works councils have 
become active in negotiating site pacts to preserve high value-added production (Rehder 2001). 
But in order to assure investment in core plants, works councils grant cost-cutting concessions: 
lower social standards, the elimination of premium wages above collective bargaining rates or 
cuts in bonuses for overtime and shift work. Employment alliances are also made through 
concessions on wages or working hours in exchange for employment guarantees.  Work may also 
be redistributed through reduced or flexible working time, or made cheaper by reducing company 
premiums above collective rates.  Thus, while works councils retain a strong role, the boundaries 
of codetermination itself are shrinking.     
The restructuring of business portfolios also plays into otherwise latent rank-and-file 
pressures on works councils.  While employees may prefer a solidaristic policy of diversification 
to maintain employment, they often ‘discover’ new interests as business units face very different 
fortunes. Core employees may prefer a stronger core business, rather than continued support for 
                                                           
13 Here tools developed to manage industrial decline in the Montan sectors are being redeployed 
to new ends of greater shareholder orientation.  
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ailing business that are less central economically.  For example, at Mannesmann before the 
hostile takeover, both employee representatives and shareholders pressed the management into 
planning hive-offs of several major divisions. Traditional machine tools employees wanted to 
secure more investment, rather than cross-subsidizing expansion into new areas.  Meanwhile, 
telecommunications employees preferred separation to avoid the conglomerate discount of their 
share price that made acquisitions expensive and increased the danger of a hostile takeover.  Here 
capital market orientation and codetermination are hardly irreconcilable opposites. 
Likewise, the introduction of variable performance-related pay also has an ambiguous 
relation to existing institutions. Works councils have become increasingly used to negotiate 
variable pay programs. These schemes have been implemented in conformity with sectoral 
collective agreements—either being paid “on top” of the collective agreement or under special 
firm-level collective agreements.  But this issue has raised substantial debate. Collective 
agreements function increasingly as framework regulations, while the formation of the 
remuneration scheme is left to the company level in consultation with works councils. Such 
variable components threaten the notion of industry-wide collectively agreed wages or at least 
lowers the portion of income regulated by collective bargaining.  Moreover, greater scope is 
given to works councils to negotiate over wages—thereby blurring the traditional division of 
labor between unions and works councils.   
Consequently, the relationship between works councils and unions is again becoming 
more tenuous.  Codetermination increasingly supports the micro goals of employees, and their 
firm-specific interests rather than wider goals of working class solidarity, e.g. principles such as 
equal pay for equal work. Because the interests of employees as producers in a particular firm are 
more heterogeneous than class interests (Streeck 1992), the heterogeneity of interests inside 
unions increases and has also led to a changing forms of collective agreements—the use of 
corridors and opting-out clauses, etc.  Likewise, codetermination as a politically guaranteed legal 
right is becoming more private and contractual. For example, the rights of works councils are 
becoming increasingly contractualized (Jackson 2003) as corporations have set up “working 
groups of works councils” to adapt to new organizational structures through negotiated rules, 
rather than using legally-based options such as the Konzernbetriebsräte.   
The current success of codetermination belies a potential danger.  While codetermination 
continues to provide a number of beneficial economic functions, the legitimacy of an institution  
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cannot rest of functionality alone.  Codetermination originated in deep-seated political values, as 
well as formative experiences of the post-war generation in rebuilding German industry.  These 
value commitments were refreshed during the political climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
where the meaning and boundaries of democracy were again tested by collective action.  As 
codetermination becomes an increasingly professionalized domain of co-management, it is less 
clearly grounded in broader societal value commitments.  In short, by successfully “managing” 
workplace conflicts, codetermination may itself erode the preconditions necessary for its own 
reproduction in the longer term.  For example, works councils were often created in new 
economy firms only after they announced their closure as the IT Bubble collapsed in 2000 or 
2001.  After winding up these firms, the councils then disappeared.  Likewise, the 
internationalization of corporations themselves poses serious challenges.  German unions are 
unlikely to have the capacities to broaden codetermination and represent corporate workforces 
overseas.  The developments in the European legal context reflect these difficulties of exporting 
German codetermination.  Again the boundaries and interpretations of the institution continue to 
be challenged.   
 
V.  Conclusion 
  This chapter has argued that understanding institutional change requires us to rethink the 
action-theoretic foundations of institutional theory. Institutions are a product of human actions, 
but are also collective phenomena that confront particular individuals as an external and objective 
“social fact” that form part of their situational context.  Rather than debate the merits of 
rational/utilitarian, normative or cognitive approaches to institutions, I have argued that the 
debate should be more focused on the creative aspects of action related to a non-teleological 
understanding of human intentionality (Joas 1992).   
Specifically, I have stressed the importance of situational ambiguity in allowing scope for 
creativity within institutionalized contexts. Ambiguity is not a competing explanation of 
institutional change on the same level as interests, norms or ideas. Rather, ambiguity is an 
element that can be applied to all these models to develop more realistic theoretical applications.  
To show its implications, the concept of ambiguity was applied to the COASE framework 
developed by Aoki (2001) in order to better interpret processes of variable reproduction or 
incremental bounded innovation of institutions.  
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These concepts were then applied to the case of German codetermination.   
Codetermination exemplifies how ambiguity may lead to variation in organizational practices in 
ways that engender change over time.  The mutability of codetermination, in fact, rests on its 
ambiguous dual mandate or what we might see as two “faces” of codetermination—limiting 
managerial authority and upholding cooperation in the interests of the firm.  Throughout its 
history, codetermination has been pulled in different directions within this horizon without ever 
leaving it entirely. Codetermination survived a number of macro-social crises, but was 
reinterpreted in light of these new experiences and by a changing constellation of key actors.  
Rather than undergoing collapse and replacement by a new institution, the “working out” of 
ambiguous relationships led codetermination to gradually evolve into an institution very different 
from its 19
th Century origins.   
Empirically, I have highlighted the contentious nature of how institutions are interpreted 
over time.  Even once basic values and principles of codetermination were institutionalized, 
contention persisted about the social boundaries of these very same institutional norms—the 
economic sectors, firms and range of managerial issues to which codetermination might be 
applied. This synchronic variation also led to diachronic changes over time.  Capacities generated 
and accumulated on small local scales were slowly institutionalized more widely.  Whereas 
cooperation was initially rare, the capacities for cooperation were gradually learned and diffused, 
while also undergoing substantial modification during this process. Had it not done so, the 
importance of codetermination for the German economy would have never been so large. Now 
the social partners again face the challenge of adapting codetermination to new capital market 
pressures or face its erosion. 
Whether or not we see such historical episodes as discontinuity or continuity depends on 
the analytical problem at hand.  But dramatic ruptures may look less dramatic over time, while 
small modifications may accumulate in ways that we see only later. The overriding lesson is to 
recall the dialectical manner in which institutional reproduction and change condition one another 






Figure I   A Subjective Game Model of Institutionalization 
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Figure II  Codetermination as an Institution:  A Schematic Overview 
 
 Imperial   
Germany 




















































Aoki, M. (1997). 'Unintended Fit : Organizational Evolution and Government Design of Institutions in 
Japan', in M. Aoki, H.-K. Kim and M. Okuno-Fujiwara (eds.), The Role of Government in East 
Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 233-
253. 
Aoki, M. (2001). Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Beckert, J. (2002). Beyond the Market. The Social Foundations of Economic Efficiency, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Berg, W. (1984). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland un Grossbritannien im ﾜ bergang zum 
organisierten Kapitalismus, Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt. 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality:  A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge, Garden City, N.Y.,: Doubleday. 
Beyer, J. and Hassel, A. (2002).  'The Effects of Convergence: Internationalisation and the Changing 
Distribution of Net Value Added in Large German Firms', Economy and Society 31/3, 309-332. 
Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Braun, S., Eberwein, W. and Tholen, J. (1992). Belegschaft und Unternehmen. Zur Geschichte und 
Soziologie der deutschen Betriebsverfassung und Belegschaftsmitbestimmung, Frankfurt am Main: 
Campus Verlag. 
Brigl-Matthiass, K. (1926). 'Die Politik des Betriebsrats', in Das Betriebsraeteproblem. Berlin, 87-109. 
Clemens, E. S. and Cook, J. M. (1999). 'Politics and Institutionalism:  Explaining Durability and Change', 
Annual Review of Sociology 25, 441-466. 
Crawford, S. and Ostrom, E. (1995). 'Grammar of Insitutions', American Political Science Review 89, 582-
599. 
Emirbayer, M. and Mische, A. (1998). 'What Is Agency?' American Journal of Sociology 103, 962-1023. 
Feldman, G. D. (1966). Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany: 1914-1918, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Fischer, W. (1974). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter des Industrialisierung, Goettingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprucht. 
Friedland, R. and Alford, R. R. (1991). 'Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional 
Contradictions', in W.Powell and P.DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 232-266. 
Fuerstenberg, F. (1958). 'Der Betriebsrat-Strukturanalyse einer Grenzinstitution', Koelner Zeitschrift fuer 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 10, 418-429. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Goffman, E. (1961). Asylums. Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates., 
Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor. 
Greif, A. (2004). ‘On Recent Developments in Institutional Analysis,’ Stanford University, mimeo.  
Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hall, P. A. and Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', MPIfG 
Discussion Paper, Koeln: Max-Planck-Institut fuer Gesellschaftsforschung. 
Hoepner, M. (2001). 'Corporate Governance in Transition:  Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value 
and Industrial Relations in Germany', MPIfG Discussion Paper 01 / 5, Koeln: Max-Planck-Institut 
fuer Gesellschaftsforschung. 
Hoepner, M. (2003). Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen? Shareholder Value, Managerherrschaft und 
Mitbestimmung in grossen deutschen Unternehmen., Frankfurt am Main: Campus. 
Hoepner, M. and Jackson, G. (2001). 'An Emerging Market fof Corporate Control?  The Case of 
Mannesmann and German Corporate Governance', MPIfG Discussion Paper 01 / 4, Koeln: Max-
Planck-Institut fuer Gesellschaftsforschung   
31 
 
Jackson, G. (2001). 'The Origins of Nonliberal Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan', in W. 
Streeck and K. Yamamura (eds.), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in 
Comparison. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 121-170. 
Jackson, G. (2003). 'Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Liberalization Pressures and 
Responses', in K. Yamamura and W. Streeck (eds.), The End of Diversity?  Prospects for German 
and Japanese Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 261-305. 
Jackson, G., Hoepner, M. and Kurdelbusch, A. (2004). 'Corporate Governance and Employees in 
Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions', in H. Gospel and A. Pendleton 
(eds.), Corporate Governance and Labour Management in Comparison. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 84-121. 
Jepperson, R. L. (1991). 'Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism', in W. W. Powell and P. J. 
DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 143-163. 
Joas, H. (1992). Die Kreativitaet des Handelns, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Joas, H. (1997). Die Entstehung der Werte, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
Kotthoff, H. (1994). Betriebsraete und Buergerstatus. Wandel und Kontinuitaet betrieblicher 
Mitbestimmung, Muenchen: Rainer Hampp Verlag. 
Kotthoff, H. (1998). 'Mitbestimmung in Zeiten interessenpolitischer Rueckschritte.  Betriebsraete 
zwischen Beteiligungsofferten und 'gnadenlosem Kostensenkungsdiktat.', Industrielle 
Beziehungen 5, 76-100. 
Lehmbruch, G. (2001). 'The Institutional Embedding of Market Economics: The German 'Model' and its 
Impact on Japan', in W. Streeck and K. Yamamura (eds.), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: 
Germany and Japan in Comparison. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 39-93. 
Lepsius, M. R. (1990). Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen, Opladen: Westdeutsche Verlag. 
Levitt, B. and March, J. G. (1988). 'Organizational Learning', Annual Review of Sociology 14, 319-340. 
Mahoney, J. (2000). 'Path Dependence in Historical Sociology', Theory and Society 29, 507-548. 
Meyer, J. M. and Rowan, B. (1977). 'Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony', American Journal of Sociology 83, 340-363. 
Milgrom, P. R. and Roberts, J. (1995). 'Complementarities, Industrial Strategy, Structure, and Change in 
Manufacturing', Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 179-208. 
Mitbestimmung, K. (1998). Mitbestimmung und neue Unternehmenskulturen Bilanz und Perspektiven, 
Guetersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Mueller, G. (1987). Mitbestimmung in der Nachkriegszeit.  Britische Besatzungsmacht - Unternehmer - 
Gewerkschaften, Duesseldorf: Schwann. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Oliver, C. (1991). 'Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes', Academy of Management Review 16, 
145-179. 
Plumpe, W. (1992). 'Die Betriebsraete in der Weimarer Republik: Eine Skizze zu ihrer Verbreitung, 
Zusammensetzung und Akzeptanz', in W. Plumpe and C. Kleinschmidt (eds.), Unternehmen 
zwischen Markt und Macht: Aspekte deutscher Unternehmens- und Industriegeschichte im 
20.Jahrhundert. Essen: Klartext Verlag, 42-60. 
Popitz, H., Bahrdt, H. P., Jueres, E. A. and Kesting, H. (1957). Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters.  
Soziologische Untersuchungen in der Huettenindustrie., Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr. 
Rehder, B. (2001). 'The Impact of Plant-Level Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness on the 
Institutional Change of the German System of Industrial Relations', Paper presented at the 13th 
Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, Amsterdam, June 28-
July 1, 2001. 
Seo, M.G. and Creed, W. E. D. (2002). 'Institutional Contradictions, Praxis, and Institutional Change: A 
Dialectical Perspective', Academy of Management Review 27, 222-247.  
32 
 
Sewell Jr., W. H. (1992). 'A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation', American 
Journal of Sociology 98, 1-29. 
Streeck, W. (1992). Social Institutions and Economic Performance: Studies of Industrial Relations in 
Advanced Capitalist economies, London: SAGE Publications. 
Teuteberg, H. J. (1961). Geschichte der industriellen Mitbestimmung in Deutschland, Tuebingen: J. C. B. 
Mohr. 
Teuteberg, H. J. (1981). 'Urspruenge und Entwicklung der Mitbestimmung in Deutschland', in H. Pohl 
(eds.), Mitbestimmung: Urspruenge und Entwicklung. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 7-73. 
Thelen, K. (1991). Union of Parts, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Thelen, K. (1999). 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', American Review of Political 
Science, 369-404. 
Thelen, K. (2003). 'How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical Analysis', in J. 
Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 208-240. 
Weisbrod, B. (1989). 'Arbeitgeberpolitik und Arbeitsbeziehungen im Ruhrbergbau.  Vom 'Herr-im-Haus' 
zur Mitbestimmung', in G. D. Feldman and K. Tenfelde (eds.), Arbeiter, Unternehmer und Staat 
im Bergbau. Muenchen: Verlag C.H.Beck, 107-162. 
White, H. C. (1992). Identity and Control: A Structural Theory of Social Action, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Whitford, J. (2002). 'Pragmatism and the Untenable Dualism of Means and Ends: Why Rational Choice 
Theory Does Not Deserve Paradigmatic Privilege', Theory and Society, 325-363. 
Whitley, R. (1999). Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business Systems, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Zilber, T. B. (2002). 'Institutionalization as an Interplay Between Actions, Meanings, and Actors: The 
Case of a Rape Crisis Center in Israel', Academy of Management Journal 45, 234-254. 
 
 
 
 
 